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Abstract: Socially minded nudges are the more sociable cousin of regular nudges: they 
reveal important information about other people’s behavior, raise normative expectations 
about what is desirable, can be shared and transmitted online or offline, and leverage social 
incentives and sanctions that regulate individual and group behavior. In this article, I argue 
that many of the most successful nudges, that is, nudges that have been well-replicated, offer 
positive spill-over, and whose effects last over time, have in fact been social nudges. 
Moreover, the efficacy of other nudges can be enhanced by considering the social dimension 
of the problem that they are trying to address. In asking where behavioral science should go 
next, I argue that although the behavioral insights team has traditionally shied away from 
addressing more complex and sticky societal issues, socially situated nudges are particularly 
well-suited to address many of the important challenges raised by Sanders et al.  
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Introduction 
 
It was in the spring of 2017 that David Halpern and I were on a panel together here in 
Cambridge talking about behavioral insights. He asked me what was keeping me busy these 
days and I had an immediate answer: fake news. I asked what the behavioral insights team is 
currently doing about the spread of fake news? Especially in light of the fact that UK 
parliament recently opened up an investigation into the various ways in which fake news is 
undermining democracy (Harriss & Raymer, 2017). Halpern asked me what I suggest they 
do, what’s my big idea? I told him that my co-authors and I have been working on developing 
a fake news “vaccine” (van der Linden et al., 2017a).  My memory is a bit foggy, but when 
asked to elaborate I recall rambling on about what a complex social issue fake news is and I 
think we both agreed that I failed to deliver a succinct and actionable policy pitch! I’m 
writing about this event because it was during my talk that I recalled another conversation, 
some years ago, with Maya Shankar (then head of the US Social and Behavioral Sciences 
Team) about what it is exactly that they’re doing about climate change, another clear 
complex global issue. To her own dismay, the short answer was “nothing”.   
 These are just two examples, but in much of my experience, “nudge” is often seen as 
almost purposefully steering clear of trying to solve some of the world’s biggest and most 
complex social dilemmas. I was therefore pleased to see clear acknowledgment of this in 
Sander’s, Snijders, & Hallsworth’s (2018) article about where we are in behavioral science 
and where we are going next. In fact, Sanders and Halpern readily admit that they have been 
advocating for the “low-hanging” fruits, at least in the early life of the behavioral insights 
team, and perhaps that made good sense to establish the viability of using behavioral science 
effectively in policy. I was also pleased to see a collective desire to tackle bigger problems. 
Indeed, as the authors state, “it would be disappointing if tax compliance were the only 
application of behavioral science active in policy ten years from now” (p. 16). As a social 
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psychologist, I spend much of my time thinking about complex societal affairs, so I 
completely agree with the observation that although these issues often seem daunting at first, 
that’s not a good reason to avoid tackling them. Of course, when it comes to thorny-
problems, we need to lower our expectations, as success is often less immediate and more 
difficult to achieve. However, it is exactly for that reason that insights from behavioral 
science are desperately needed in this area. While Sanders et al. claim to have made 
dedicated attempts to start tackling bigger problems, such as poverty and recidivism, their 
section on thorny-problems reads more like a side note rather than an agenda-defining item. 
 I understand the difficulties. When we published a policy memo distilling key insights 
from psychological science to help improve behavioral decision-making about climate 
change (van der Linden, Maibach, Leiserowitz, 2015), Cass Sunstein (2015) wondered how 
much we can achieve in policy with better communications. This remark is ironic of course, 
given that some of the most successful nudges have relied on exactly such insights: a simple 
tweak in wording can be a powerful lever for behavior change, from mobilizing people to 
vote to saving household energy consumption (Cialdini, Martin, & Goldstein, 2015; 
Panagopolous & van der Linden, 2016;). Nonetheless, I can understand the pessimism, and 
Sunstein is correct of course in that some of these problems are going to need much more 
than a simple nudge. Moving from encouraging people to use double-sided printing to 
countering violent extremism is quite the behavioral stretch. In fact, polarized issues like 
climate change are not low-hanging fruits, they often require so-called “heavy lifting”, i.e. the 
type of controversial policies whose adoption are likely to face serious obstacles (Sunstein, 
2015). So where does that leave us? Although Sanders et al.’s review covers an impressive 
range of issues, from the replication crisis and small effects to spillover and thorny problems, 
its breadth necessarily restricts its depth. Little advice is offered on how behavioral science 
can tackle some of the world’s most pressing social issues, including fake news, extremism, 
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inequality, and climate change. When I was first invited to write a response, I wondered what 
else I can say about nudge that Sanders et al. haven’t addressed in their article? Yet, the more 
I thought about how to effectively address thorny-problems using insights from behavioral 
science, the more it dawned on me that 1) the theory of nudge is socially impoverished in 
some ways, which is important, because 2) many of the most “successful” behavioral insights 
have in fact been socially-minded nudges. They have been successful in the sense that they 
satisfy many of the problems discussed and reviewed by Sanders et al., i.e. nudges that are 
replicable, scalable, have positive spill-over and shown some promise of long-term effects, 
especially in the context of major societal issues. Accordingly, in the remainder of my 
response, I will argue that in order to tackle thorny, complex, and deeply embedded social 
problems we need more socially minded nudges.  
 
The Power of Socially Situated Nudges  
 
Not all nudges are social. In fact, let me summarize the spirit of social nudges: they inform us 
about the behavior of relevant others, raise normative behavioral expectations in some way, 
leverage social incentives and sanctions, or are socially networked and transmissible from 
one individual to another. The social nature of the nudge could be implicit or explicit, online 
or offline. Interestingly, when you think about the definition of the “NUDGE” acronym 
(Thaler & Sunstein, 2009), it becomes clear that there are few explicit social elements present 
(“iNcentives”, Understand “mappings”, “Defaults”, “Give feedback”, “Expect error”, and 
“Structure complex choices”). To illustrate, the idea of altering the order in which healthy 
food options appear in school cafeterias involves nothing inherently “social”.  The choice 
environment here seems to mean “physical” environment. Clearly, the environment is also 
social (people queuing), but the nudge itself is not socially situated in that it is does not 
inform people about the behavior of others, there are no pronounced social expectations, the 
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nudge is not designed to be socially shared or transmitted and there are no social incentives or 
sanctions regulating an individual’s behavior. This is not to say that regular nudges are not 
successful (on the contrary). It is just evident that in much nudge-thinking, the focus seems to 
be geared towards reducing cognitive load and effort, rather than thinking about the social 
dimensions of the nudge. Perhaps the greatest testament of this is one of Thaler’s personal 
favorites: the urinal fly nudge. Clearly, aiming at a photorealistic image of a fly is more of a 
private matter than a socially shared activity. It also illustrates the banality of nudge many 
people seem to associate with it: reducing urinal spillage solves one kind of problem but it 
isn’t tackling some of societies greatest challenges.However, in general, “standard” nudges 
may benefit a great deal from upping their social IQ. For example, in light of hyperbolic 
discounting, the “Save More Tomorrow” Plan focuses on having people commit in advance 
to allocating a portion of their salary to retirement savings (Thaler & Benartzi, 2004). 
Although effective, there is nothing particularly social about this nudge. Yet, “Save More 
Tomorrow” commitments could be increased further by informing people how many referent 
others are participating (making it a social, group-based initiative) —similar social norm 
strategies have proven highly effective in other areas (Cialdini et al., 2015). There are many 
more examples. Take the case-in-point of trying to reduce cognitive load when it comes to 
filling out complicated forms to receive free school meals. Such forms are problematic, as 
low-income individuals often already have limited cognitive bandwidth (Mullainathan & 
Shafir, 2013). Automatic enrolment has greatly benefitted underprivileged communities in 
this regard, but the nudge fails to account for the fact that free school lunches are heavily 
stigmatized (Oostindjer et al., 2016), further stigmatization of poverty can be an unintended 
social consequence (one of the key issues raised by Sanders et al. 2017). For example, in the 
UK, 29% of eligible children do not participate in the UK’s Free School Meals program. So 
why not design an appropriate socially-situated nudge instead? Indeed, reframing free school 
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lunches as a program that is available to all children may be effective. For example, a rise in 
wider peer-group participation reduced non-participation among low-income children 
between 29% and 35% (Holford, 2015). Because much of human behavior is inherently 
social, it seems difficult to argue against the need for more socially-minded nudges. We can 
ask, however, whether social nudges have indeed delivered on their potential? I’ll review 
some key examples of complex societal issues below, where social nudges have shown to be 
replicable and scalable, with good potential for long-term effects and positive spill-overs.  
 
Limiting global climate change 
The importance of insights from behavioral science has been increasingly highlighted in 
climate change policy-making (van der Linden, Maibach, & Leiserowitz, 2015). In fact, one 
of the largest real-world behavioral science experiments has become a posterchild for the 
success of “behavioral insights” (Cialdini, Martin, & Goldstein, 2015). The company 
OPOWER supplied millions of customers with tailored energy bills revealing social 
information about the consumption of their neighbors (Allcott, 2011; Schultz et al., 2007). 
On average, the intervention led to a reduction in household energy consumption of 2%.  
Although this sounds small, when scaled across millions of households, this is a 
classic example of the argument that “small effects can add up to large-scale policy 
consequences” (Cialdini et al. 2015) — being the equivalent of a 11% to 20% short-run price 
increase (Allcott, 2011). This finding has been replicated in many policy-relevant domains, 
from tax compliance (Hallsworth et al. 2017) and antibiotic prescriptions (Hallsworth et al. 
2016) to water conservation (Ferraro & Price, 2013), including meta-analytic evidence (van 
der Linden & Chryst, 2017). Moreover, although social norm interventions decay 
substantially over time (van der Linden, 2015, 2017a), they have been among the few 
initiatives that do reveal some long-term effects on behavior even when the interventions are 
discontinued (Allcott & Roberts, 2014; Ferraro & Price, 2013; Schultz et al., 2007). In 
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addition, descriptive norms have also shown to result in positive spill-over. For example, in 
the context of charitable donations, observing generous donating behavior not only increases 
donations but also inspires other, unrelated types of prosocial behavior (Nook et al., 2016).
 These nudges are inherently social because they inform a) people about the behavior 
of referent others and b) set normative expectations about what type of behavior is “typical” 
and “desired” — reinforcing conformity with the desired norm. Importantly, many social 
processes are recursive allowing nudges to initiate virtuous feedback cycles. For example, 
when more people conform to the desired norm, the social signal becomes stronger and more 
persuasive, encouraging further compliance. Social nudges are important in these type of 
complex social dilemmas because people’s sense of self-efficacy is often contingent on their 
perception of how many others are contributing (Kerr & Kaufman-Gilliland, 1989).   
Another relevant example is the use of so-called “green defaults”. Defaults are a 
classic nudge, and their effectiveness has been demonstrated in a variety of contexts, from 
encouraging retirements savings (Thaler & Benartzi, 2004) to organ donor registration 
(Johnson & Goldstein, 2003) to green energy (Pichert, Konstantinos, & Katsikopoulos, 2008) 
with some evidence to suggest that defaults can increase green energy uptake by tenfold 
(Ebeling & Lotz, 2015). The classic explanation for the success of defaults is not social: 
people stick with it because it takes more cognitive effort to adjust away from the default 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). However, a number of recent studies have advanced another, 
social explanation to account for the default-effect. Defaults communicate implicit norms 
(Davidai, Gilovich, & Ross, 2012), that is, defaults signal what the normatively desired 
course of action is (McKenzie, & Liersch, & Finkelstein, 2006). By setting defaults, 
institutions implicitly engage in norm-signaling (Tankard & Paluck, 2016), for example, 
universities that adopt sustainable defaults implicitly signal what the desired prototypical 
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behavioral choice for the group is, which can not only increase behavioral uptake but also 
promote public acceptability of related policies (Santos & van der Linden, 2016). 
  
Voting: Leave or Remain? 
Mobilizing citizens to vote is classic example of a difficult social dilemma. Yet, simple 
implicit social cues, such as mere images of human eyes have shown to increase voter turn-
out in local elections (Panagopolous, 2014; Panagopolous & van der Linden, 2016). Human 
gaze detection is an evolved cognitive mechanism that largely draws on areas of the brain 
that are not under voluntary control, so images or shapes that resemble human eyes can be 
sufficient to trigger the involuntary detection of another's gaze. Panagopoulos (2014) reports 
an average effect-size of 2%. Although modest, raising turnout by a few percentage points 
can have large practical consequences in districts with hundreds of thousands of voters. 
Critical societal issues such as the EU Brexit referendum (51.9% vs. 48.1%) can depend on 
relatively small differences in voter turn-out. More generally, there is some evidence that eye 
cues can elicit cooperation across domains, from reducing theft to charitable donations 
(Bateson et al., 2013; Ernest-Jones, Nettle, & Bateson, 2011; Nettle, Not, & Bateson, 2012). 
 Larger effects have been observed with more explicit social norm interventions, such 
as revealing the average voting history in a household, or the voting behavior of neighbors, 
raising voter turn-out by as much as 8% (Gerber, Green, & Larimer, 2008), which is cost-
effective at a rate of $2-$3 per vote. Social networks further illustrate the power of socially-
situated nudges. Messages delivered to over 60 million Facebook users during a 2010 US 
election not only influenced information-seeking and voting behavior, but also the behavior 
of a user’s friends and friends of friends. Importantly, the effect of social transmission was 
greater than the direct effect of the messages themselves (Bond et al., 2012). These effects 
aren’t short-lived either. Davenport et al. (2010) tracked over a million voters, and found that 
the effects of social norm communications can last up to two years after the initial treatment.  
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The Fake News Nudge 
The rise of fake news and misinformation poses serious threats to people’s ability to form 
evidence-based judgments (Lewandowsky et al. 2018; Schwartz, Newman, & Leach, 2017; 
van der Linden, 2017b). A high majority of Americans find that fake news leaves them 
confused over basic facts (Barthel, Mitchell, & Holcomb, 2016). Although the root causes of 
increasing societal conflict and political polarization are clearly complex, this in itself does 
not preclude the implementation of behavioral insights to help protect people from being 
misled by false information. For example, in a recent Science editorial, we highlight that it is 
possible to pre-emptively warn and inoculate people against fake news across the political 
spectrum (van der Linden et al., 2017b). Inoculation theory draws on a biological analogy: 
just as injections with a weakened dose of a virus can offer resistance to future infection by 
triggering antibodies in the immune system, the same can reasonably be achieved with 
information. Research in different domains, from public health to politics to climate change 
has shown that through warnings and “cognitive rehearsal” (i.e. pre-emptively debunking a 
falsehood), attitudinal resistance can be conferred (Banas & Rains, 2010; Niederdeppe, 
Heley, & Barry, 2015) and politicization can be counteracted (Bolsen & Druckman, 2015; 
Cook, Lewandowsky, & Ecker, 2017; van der Linden et al., 2017a).    
 Warnings about disputed content can help nudge people from relying predominantly 
on a “system 1” (heuristic) to more of a “system 2” (deliberate) type information processing. 
Controlled laboratory evaluations of Facebook’s disputed warning label system (tagging 
articles that have been disputed by independent fact-checkers) have shown some promise in 
reducing their credibility (Pennycook, Cannon, & Rand, 2017). On the Behavioral Public 
Policy Blog, Baggio and Motterlini (2017) suggest other real-world social applications of 
inoculation, for example, in the context of vaccine hesitancy, as after childbirth parents are 
typically overwhelmed and may be more susceptible to misinformation. Other potential 
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societal applications include building cognitive resistance to extremism and radicalization in 
conflict areas. Inoculation can also offer cross-over protection to related, but experimentally 
untreated beliefs (Parker, Ivanov, & Compton, 2012) and although the effect decays, there is 
some evidence to suggest that resistance can persist over time (Niederdeppe et al., 2015).   
Thus far, the fake news nudge itself appears to have no social element, as inoculation 
is mostly about achieving cognitive resistance to misinformation. However, the most 
powerful application of inoculation lies in its ability to spread (van der Linden et al., 2017b), 
both online through social networks, as well as interpersonally (Compton & Pfau, 2009; 
Ivanov et al., 2012). In this sense, the vaccine metaphor can be extended so that potential 
herd immunity and societal resistance can be achieved against misinformation. This could 
occur when a sufficient number of people have been inoculated in a network or when the rate 
of transmission of the “vaccine” outpaces the rate at which misinformation replicates. In 
short, the most important consequence of inoculation is its ability to be scaled at population-
level through social transmission. For example, we have developed a “fake news” inoculation 
game that can be played and shared online1. These are all areas where behavioral insights 
obtained from large-scale randomized controlled trials would be of great value.  
 
Conclusion 
In sum, many of the most successful nudges have been socially-oriented. Importantly, these 
nudges are well-replicated, have positive spill-over effects, and last over time. Conversely, 
the efficacy of traditional nudges may be enhanced —and unintended negative consequences 
can be averted —by considering the social dimension of the problem the nudge is trying to 
solve. In asking where behavioral science is going next, I hope to have illustrated that thorny 
problems often concern recursive social processes that can be more effectively addressed 
                                                          
1 www.fakenewsgame.org 
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with socially-minded nudges. For many of my psychologist colleagues I have probably not 
gone far enough (e.g. see Mols et al., 2015), as many of society’s most urgent challenges 
reflect deep commitments to social groups and identities and are going to need more than a 
simple nudge. But upping the social IQ of every existing and new nudge is a step in the right 
direction: does this nudge signal what behavior is desired? Is the nudge socially inclusive? 
Does it inspire more people to comply? Can the nudge be shared and transmitted? Social 
nudges may be simple, but they have the distinct advantage of making friends, they can turn a 
drop into a wave, transform an individual into a crowd, and crowds can change the world.  
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